Any EDR must have full disk access (FDA) and kernel extension approval (or System Extensions on Apple Silicon). Without FDA, you cannot scan ~/Library/Keychains or ~/Library/Mail . 5. Detection Queries Every Mac Admin Should Run Use these to hunt for compromise (via your EDR or osquery ). 5.1 Suspicious LaunchAgents (Persistence) SELECT * FROM launchd WHERE path LIKE '/Users/%/Library/LaunchAgents/%' AND (name LIKE '%update%' OR name LIKE '%java%' OR name LIKE '%google%'); -- Look for masquerading names 5.2 Users Running with UID 0 (Privilege Escalation) ps aux | awk '$1=="root" print $11' | sort -u # Check for unexpected processes like Python, Ruby, Node running as root 5.3 Bypass of Gatekeeper find /Applications -name "*.app" -exec spctl --assess --verbose {} \; # Any output "rejected" is fine; "accepted" but from untrusted source is suspicious 5.4 Unusual AppleScript Usage (UI control) grep -r "osascript" /Users/*/Library/Logs/ # Combined with login items = possible infostealer 5.5 Keychain Access Attempts Monitor security command line invocations:
<key>PayloadType</key> <string>com.apple.TCC.configuration-profile-policy</string> <key>Services</key> <dict> <key>Accessibility</key> <array> <dict> <key>Allowed</key> <false/> <key>CodeRequirement</key> <string>identifier "com.malicious.app"</string> </dict> </array> </dict> | Capability | Why Needed | Vendor Examples (not exhaustive) | |------------|-------------|----------------------------------| | EDR (Endpoint Detection & Response) | Behavioral detection, process ancestry, script analysis | CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Microsoft Defender for Endpoint | | Application allowlisting | Blocks unapproved tools (e.g., Atomic Stealer droppers) | Santa (open source), Airlock Digital | | Browser isolation | Prevents drive‑by downloads from executing | Menlo, Cloudflare Browser Isolation | | Privileged Access Management (PAM) | Just‑in‑time admin rights, ephemeral elevation | BeyondTrust, Delinea (formerly Centrify) | | USB device control | Prevents BadUSB / Rubber Ducky attacks | Endpoint Protector, Jamf Private Access | mac endpoint security
| Threat Type | Example | macOS Specificity | |-------------|---------|--------------------| | | Atomic Stealer, Realst | Target browser cookies, crypto wallets, Keychain passwords | | Ransomware | LockBit for Mac (ESXi locker) | Encrypts user directories, leverages osascript for persistence | | Phishing | Fake login prompts (Apple ID) | Bypasses MFA via session token theft (not just password) | | Supply chain | Compromised Homebrew/Swift packages | Privilege escalation via sudo during install | | Adversary-in-the-Middle | EvilQuest variant | Uses AppleScript to control UI and approve dialogs | Any EDR must have full disk access (FDA)